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All attempts to illumine clearly the point at which the theological conflict
among us arises render a commendable service. So it is fitting to welcome the
contribution by Paul Jager in Die Christliche Welt 25 ( 1905). Without sentimental
phraseology and with serious effort to establish a clear position, Jager demands
that theology utilize "the atheistic method." His remarks were prompted by
Liitgert' s statement' that even in historical observation and judgments God is not
to be ignored; an untheological theologian would be a self-contradiction. To this
Jager replies that the atheistic method is the only scientific one: "We wish to
explain the world (including religion, whether its social formation or the experience of the individuall on the basis of this world," i.e., "we wish to explain it,
without any recourse to the concept of God, on the basis of the forces that are
immanent within the world process." In Jager's view, then, today's dominant leitmotif in all branches of science must function in the same way in theology. Jager
has therefore boldly countered Liitgert' s remark: While Liitgert indicates that it is
impossible to ignore God, Jager answers: 'Entirely right! And we do not wish to
ignore him; rather, we wish to negate him.' For whoever wishes to explain all
phenomena "immanently" (on the basis of this-worldly factors alone)-whether
Jesus' divine Sonship or our own knowledge of God, whether human sinfulness
or the apostolic gospel-does not ignore God but negates him. Any recourse to
God is here excluded not only temporarily from scientific thinking, say in the
interest of producing pure, authentic observation, but is categorically banned.
The essential characteristic of theology becomes that it is blind to God. "The scientific method," says Jager, "ignorat deum, knows nothing of God."
This blindness toward God is naturally characteristic of the theologian only in
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terms of his scientific functioning; as a religious person he does not possess it. The religious person keeps his piety separate from his scientific endeavor. In this regard Jagers
presentation is not some new proposal that could hamper scientific obsetvation. It is the

old, sharply delineated dualism that we have long since learned from Kant, Jakobi,
Schleiermacher, Fries, etc.: The heathen head and the pious heart, the atheistic scientific
knowledge and the religious sentiment, etc., etc. Yet in contrast to the older attempts to
split up the person, the situation has shifted significantly. Formerly the atheistic head produced things like natural science, knowledge of the world, philosophy; piety, including
theology, stood alongside these as a separate domain. Now Jager argues not merely that
our interpretation of nature or epistemology is unavoidably atheistic and knows nothing
of God; he says this of theology. The dualism which he recommends to us takes the following form: As theologians you interpret religion immanently, apart from God; as religious persons you consider it to be relationship with God. In other words, as theologians
you must demonstrate what you as Christians deny. And as pious people you have to
affirm what you as theologians oppose.
Logically it is entirely clear-or as Jager might put it, "explicable in purely immanent
terms" -that the older forms of dualism are carried further in this harsher formulation.
Since religion is a part of human history and, parallel to that, of individual life-histories
as well, there exists a science of religion. If science is inherently atheistic, and if it is
obligated to wall itself off from the concept of God, this inevitably applies to the science of religion, too. Once one has assigned to "piety" the task of stating its views in
opposition to the "scientific explanation of the world," one must also grant it the
capacity to state its views in opposition to theology. But this intensifies the old dualism

to such extent that it is bound to tear apart both the individual personality, inasmuch
as it participates in the scientific and religious life simultaneously, and the fellowship
that is peculiar to the church.
Jager calls his article an aid "toward understanding"; this subtitle is completely appropriate, since what he writes sheds bright light on the entire difficulty of our church situation.' That which is still unclear in what he says merits thorough consideration.
I.

SHOULD DOGMATICS ALSO BE ATHEISTIC?

Regarding this question Jagers remarks are imprecise. His final formulation of the
problem ("The question we face is this: Should theology be religious science or the science of religion?") is muddled. We all support the science of religion, i.e., scientific
inquiry whose object is religion. And the issue is also not "religious science" in general
without determination of its object. The question turns rather on the formulation of

the relationship in which science stands to religion as fact and experience. Does the
science of religion affirm or deny religion? Does it dispute religion and dismiss it as
illusion or give an account of it? The question centers not on isolated specifics and
ramifications of religious occurrence, but on the central matter, the affirmation or

denial of God. The logical confusion of Jager' s question arises from the confidence
with which he puts forth his concept of science as the only possible and valid one.
From the outset "the science of religion" means for him the atheistic criticism and

explanation of religion. That is why he sees it in self-evident logical opposition to "reli-

Atheistic Methods in Theology

47

gious science."

Jager goes on to say about his science of religion: "Since science does not acknowledge God, the science of religion and therefore also scientific theology have to do only
with the subjective attitude of man. This holds true for the history of religions in general
as well as for biblical and church history." Here theology is conceived exclusively as history, and dogmatics, along with ethics, is either forgotten or eliminated by a hasty amputation. Even if it be only forgotten, the fact that a theologian can speak of the superfluity
of the concept of God in theology, without so much as even a thought for dogmatics, is
highly illuminating.' Yet the problem is not the specific fonnulation of Jager's train of
thought. It lies in the fundamental orientation of the approach he describes. The aims
with which the dogmatician and ethicist go about their work are taboo for "scientific theology." In other words, it would be a mistake to suppose that the atheistic method of
theology implies an atheistic dogmatics and ethics; these must, on the contrary, simply
cease to exist. If our historical observation is thought to establish finn conviction regarding God, so that some event becomes for us a revelation of God, Jager's response is that
such "inconsistency in academic work would have to be called dogmatic method and
rejected." Dogmatic and scientific are here conceived as mutually excluding opposites,
and the denial demanded for the one by each component of the other is for Jager selfevident True, he wishes to establish for theology its rightful place within the entire complex of scientific work in the university. But his concern does not extend to theological
labor in its entirety. In the university and in the sphere of science, the dogmatician and
the ethicist are nothing but withered trees to be cut down.
Since Jager wants to move us "toward understanding," it will be helpful if opponents of thinkers like Liitgert and me get a clear grasp of why we do not renounce
dogmatics as a science. Emotional attachments are not what move us, as if our mood
required production of some sort of conceptual literature to stay afloat. Far more
important, though not yet finally decisive, is the consideration that the renunciation of
dogmatics destroys religious community. There is no Christian congregation without
dogma, without shared affirmations resulting in common convictions. So the question

of what grounds and shapes the Christian congregation and its fellowship as a common certainty is of profound importance for every Christian. And the more unsteady
and fluid the spiritual devotion of the congregation becomes, the more important the
question grows. Now an opponent might reply to us: 'What kind of a narrow-minded
notion this is; as if science had anything to do with praxis or theology with the
church!' But such protest would reflect thinking that is really not modern at all but
breathes the spirit of a past generation, one haunted and tonnented by the shadow of
a fanciful "pure reason" which in olden times fluttered around over reality and therefore never made connection with the praxis and the great social relations of life which
shape us. In the contemporary university a theology would be eminently justifiable
whose most earnest concern were to provide the church the theory it requires for it to
be a religious community. Indeed, with their scientific work even our medical authori-

ties and natural scientists, our national economists and historians, stand in intimate
relationship to "practical" tasks of the present time.
Yet in glancing at the church's need we have not yet touched the most profound
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reason for insisting on dogmatics. We must have dogmatics for truth's sake.
Jagers reduction of "theology" to history sidesteps the truth question and thereby
does damage also to the concept of science. The historian who seeks to observe what

happened, and under what conditions, and what is perhaps a causal factor lying
behind an event, is unquestionably obedient to the canon of truth in his work. But
that same canon sets him limits. To the extent that he is the observer intent on an

object, he grants the canon its power. But only to that extent: To go farther would be
to suspend the canon. The canon cannot furnish him, as long as he is only a historian,

unconditioned mastery. He holds his own personality in a state of suspension and
abstains from forming the judgment that he might be inherently inclined to make.
Thus he presents religious illusion as well as the ethically pure will, the frivolous atheism as well as that faith which upholds the Protestant doctrine of justification, with the
same fidelity "as a photographic camera," to use Jagers phrase. Even the inner life of
the individual is understood according to this same method: The historian elucidates
how the religious conceptions arise within him; which circumstances cause them;
what becomes visible, perhaps regarding causal links, between the events he scruti-

nizes. With this his attentiveness has borne all the fruit it can. His knowledge has
reached its limits. ls his task complete 7 If we say yes, then we are in a cowardly way
evading the truth question.

No refinement in the historian's art can alter this. We may deepen the concept of
"history" ever so much; we may be realists in the highest sense in historical research
and bear within us the deep conviction that what has occurred in the past affects us
with causal force, that the past generates and forms us even in the course of our thinking and willing. Nevertheless, at no time are we able to grant absolute formative power

over us to past events, so that the narration of that which once took place renders our
own judgment superfluous, tradition replacing our own thinking and external norms of
volition, acting on us from without, replacing our own volition. We remain continually

summoned to an act of thought in which our own personality forms its judgment. That
is a central tenet of biblical, or if the opponent does not grant this, certainly Protestant
spiritual devotion. The historian, however, never reaches this point; he must maintain a
suspended state of personal indecision and irresolution, so long as he is nothing but a

historian and knows nothing but that which took place in the past. And that is why a
theology that is nothing more than history is intolerable for the Protestant church and is
its death: Such theology leaves untouched its scientific obligation.
J.3ger is governed by the dictum: dogmatic, therefore unscientific. But in fact the

relation between the goal of historical and dogmatic theological inquiry runs in the
opposite direction as soon as the truth question in its absolute form is opened up
without restriction and stipulation. For a theology which can only tell little stories and
thus is frozen in indecision and thoughtlessness is a farce when measured by scientific

standards, even if it gives its historical novels titles like Life of Jesus or New Testament
Theology. Such a theology must cower in shame when compared with the realism of
natural science-but also compared with the earnestness which inheres in the history

of language, of law, of the nation and the state, etc. On the other hand, if theology
does not permit its goal to be attenuated and leaves room for the truth- and God-
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question with their absolute gravity, then it stands parallel to the other branches of
research in their close ties to reality. Admittedly this opens the possibility that we will
also receive negative, atheistic dogmatics and ethics, e.g., a dogmatics for which the
atheistically-conceived, closed-nexus concept of the world does not function solely as
a "methodological" principle but is earnestly affirmed, thus transforming theology into
cosmology. However, a negative dogmatics, which opposes the concept of God and
of course is obligated to ground its thesis in the same way as positive, God-affirming
dogmatics, will always be an aid to clear distinction and decision in thinking and volition, while the reduction of theology to mere history with its endless observing and
penchant for exotic religious expression radically undermines thought and volition in
the end.
2. WHY SHOULD THE HISTORY OF REl.IGION BE A THBSTIC?

Let us now follow Jager where his interest leads him: Why does the history of religion require the atheistic method? With welcome clarity he states his claim not as a
theoretical certainty, scientific proposition, or the like, but as a decision: "We will" to
explain the world immanently, so the scientific "leitmotif' should be purely immanent
in conception, i.e., conceived in such a way that the God-question may not arise at all.
1 call this welcome because it says good-bye to formulations like absolute science and
pure reason. Jager thus makes use of an important gain in today's understanding of
the knowing process; he too is aware of the close relation between the course of
thinking and wilting. All thinking contains within it a volitional component, so that
what "we will" appears in our science. In saying this, of course, none of us attributes to
ourselves a sovereign power of establishing facts that is exempt from all substantiation
and justification. If thinking and willing are bound together, then thinking is not
denied and reduced merely to willing. For Jager, too, 'The leitmotif' of science "is
something arrived at and sustained by thinking."
The question therefore stands before us: Why do "we will" thus? In the first place,
who are the "we?" Formerly, right down to the previous generation, they did not exist
in the church. True, rightly or wrongly the exclusion of the idea of God from theological observation, occurred often enough; nevertheless, up until the present time there
was never a theology that as a matter of principle banned the idea of God from its
sphere of labor and sought to explain religion "immanently without recourse to the
idea of God." Not until recently have the "we" made their debut. Jager himself tells us
as much: The type of theological work that he recommends is as a matter of principle
distinct from all earlier work in the church, which he deems to have been "unscientific." Now for the theologian the unity of the church is not some trivial notion having
absolutely nothing to do with the effort to perceive and understand with all possible
diligence the transformations that have taken place in the church's thinking and willing. Commonality with the earlier work of the church takes on great weight for the
theologian because of the easily sustainable observation that we, in our own religiosity,
are incorporated into a common life binding successive generations to one another. In
view of the whole inner situation of Protestantism, however, it is not at all surprising
that Jager facilely makes a radical break. What can the past offer to the theologian?
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"We cannot close our minds to the fact," says Jager, that we have to forge a new theology, one that breaks with all that has heretofore gone by that name. So forget about
the ancients, who in their unmodern unscientific way thought that they must deal
earnestly with the knowledge of God in theology! "We" in the universities must internalize and further modern definitions of our goals. And why is this the case?
"We will to have a scientific theology, i.e., a science of the religious life, that stands
in precise contact with the scientific awareness and labors of our time. We want to

remain in touch with what is today generally regarded as scientific." The atheistic
method "is the seminal scientific idea of our time."
Is Jager observing correctly? It seems to me that here once again mists from an ear-

lier time have blurred his vision. The absolute rationality and explicability of nature
was at one time the leitmotif for the Cartesian and Spinozan interpretation of nature.
But is it really still true today that natural science is ruled by the motivating principle:
"! wish to explain, and to do so on the basis of purely this-worldly factors"? Natural
science wishes to observe, certainly also to explain, yet only so far as observation suggests causal connections to us. And that is utterly true of historical science! Where is
an earnest laborer in the discipline of history who is not painfully aware of the
immense difficulty involved in really seeing and observing in the face of historical

processes, and how much caution is required of us to guard against cheap pseudoexplanations? The concept of the world as Jager wields it, which he unde"tands as a
self-generating and self-sustaining unity, does not come from the observation of
nature, much less from historical perception, but grows from speculative roots. It is on

this basis that Jager demands of the theologian that he undertake what every other scientific enterprise refuses, namely, to allow its operating principle to be forced upon it
by allegedly omniscient speculation. In rejecting Li.itgert's thesis, "In every historical
method lies a hidden dogmatics," Jager at the same time furnishes the finest evidence

for it. For his idea of "worid," which confers atheistic self-sufficiency on "world," so
that in the entire realm of historical occurrence nothing may or can become visible
except for "world," constitutes in itself a dogmatics. But it is a dogmatics that is worthless at the outset, because it is not arrived at and substantiated by effort but rather

adopted as law merely because "everyone" accepts it. "The age accepts it; therefore I
must accept it, too"; that is certainly a novel theological method; till now such talk was
never heard in the church.
We all see that atheistic tendencies are widespread in the universities. We also all
see that they contain at least a measure of the earnestness of scientific verification, i.e.,

they are based on our contemporary view of nature and arise from careful apprehension of the discrete systems that make up the natural process as well as the power
pervading that process even to the whole of the inner life. If Jager had said: "You must
explain religion on the basis of nature; everything that you call religious experience is

a physical occurrence, and the concept of God is a confused synonym for nature,"
then his formulation would actually stand in continuity with the currents of the time.
And it would likewise point to one of the great challenges that our present age poses
for theological work.
But mark this. Even if we come to terms with the scientific energy that animates
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today's atheistic mood, and if we keep alive its power over the circle of those who
labor in the realm of research and new discovery, that still gives no legitimate basis for
the will that states: "We will to explain religion solely on the basis of this-worldly factors." What obligates us as members of the universitas /itterarum !the scholarly guild] as
an inviolable duty is that we, in the field of labor appointed to us, succeed at seeing, at
chaste, unsullied observation, at a comprehension of the real event, be it one that took
place in the past or one that is just now happening That is the ceterum censeo for
every labor within the university. Science is first seeing and secondly seeing and thirdly
seeing and again and again seeing. From this vocation nothing absolves us, whatever
else may occur in other scientific fields of labor. Let us grant that the atheistic disposition of the natural scientist arises in natural science with compelling necessity, or that
the cultural historian in the course of his observations generates, legitimately and

unavoidably, a skepticism worthy of Montaigne. Still, none of that would ever in itself
legitimate the atheistic theologian, nor relieve us of our duty to approach our own
field of labor with open observation. The fruit of colleagues' work may have the greatest significance for us, or it may create problems of weightiest, indeed impenetrable
mystery. Regardless, the theologian remains obligated to regard the realm of occurrence entrusted to him with resolute devotion to his own object. He can arrive at the
verdict of atheism only by way of observation of the religious occurrence itself. If he
borrows it from the general mood or natural science, then his atheism dishonors him.
If theology were a comprehensive knowledge of the world like the older philosophy,
then it would admittedly have to go borrowing and begging. There are, however,
entirely distinct events which produce both the certainty of God for humanity and
within the individual life. This certainty is bound up with them and works its effects
through them. As theologians we owe these events an eye that is not deceived by a
borrowed leitmotif but that seeks to comprehend its object with a complete devotion
to it. Even if it were true that the natural scientist nowhere found cause to arrive at
the idea of God; even if it were true that the historian nowhere encountered events
pointing beyond humanity, nowhere encountered a law greater than human will,
nowhere encountered a judgment that breaks to pieces human will as sin; even if it
were so that also in the theological domain of observation there nowhere emerged a
well-founded consciousness of God, nowhere except-let us say: in the way that Jesus
lived in God, here however it emerged as an undeniable reality with a power
demanding assent from the theologian-in this case the basis and content of theology
would be admittedly small, but atheistic theology would be destroyed. Jager, however,
does not wish to engage in painstaking observation; he knows a pnori that in Jesus he
is dealing only with man, just as he also knows a pnori that when he encounters the
sinful will in man, he has only come in conflict with a human notion of what matters.
"Theology,'' Jager states, "stands on equal footing in the framework of the universitas
litterarum only so long as it too can, frankly and honestly and not just in appearance,
advocate the universally recognized scientific methods." But there are no general
methods which can be transferred from one area of inquiry to another beyond those
rules that are grounded directly in the way that cognition takes place. Therefore it is a
general and inviolable scientific rule that every judgment must be preceded by
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painstaking observation, and all our own conclusions must be preceded by the act of
reception, without which our own production bursts into wind and illusions. The atheistic conception of the world is not a category constituent of the act of cognition.
Surely the history of recent generations proves this sufficiently. Up to and including
the time of Kant's death, the concept of God was looked upon as an essential possession of reason. For the generation after Kant the self-consciousness of reason was one

with the consciousness of God. Now for the "we" blindness toward God is the essential attribute of all science. Theology is too serious a matter, and it is entrusted with an
area of life too significant, for it to allow itself to ape such deviations in servile deference to fleeting contemporary moods.

Jager offers us the friendly advice "to have the resolve to withdraw from the university'' since we do not find ourselves in agreement with the atheistic disposition in it.
For us, too, our honor in the sphere of scientific researchers is an important regulating
principle, for the simple reason that it is an effective means of work, which is what
gives honor its moral worth in all relationships. But it remains for the moment an

open question whether we have lost that honor by openly remaining theologians, to
the extent that individual energy permits, and as theologians observing honestly and
thinking valiantly. And it is far more doubtful that the atheistic theology would
deserve that honor. In any case, the atheistic theological enterprise would be the most
certain means of destroying the theological faculties. If it ever really comes to pass that
our students read the New Testament just like they read Homer, and our exegetes
explain it like they do Homer with determined elimination of every God-directed
idea, then the theological faculties have reached the end of the line.
3.

Do WE LOSE WITH THE ATHEISTIC METHOD?
Jager fears no loss from his method: Only the theologian would be atheistic, not his
personal identity; only the method of scientific work, not the personal status of the
worker; only the science, but this would be merely "the maidservant of human
inquiry, not its lord" and "does not speak the last word."
But here the concept "method" contains a striking ambiguity. It merely points a
"way," Jager claims-but the choice of the way occurs here through the fixing of the
goal. The proposition: "We will to explain Christ, and for that matter Christianity, both
as corporate entity and personal experience, on the basis of this-worldly factors alone,
without any reference to God," contains a fully determined intellectual goal which
specifies the result of the entire theological enterprise. Here method does not simply
furnish preliminary guidance dealing with the technique which theological work
should employ. Rather it pronounces a judgment on the emergence and essence of
religious phenomena. If I say: Chemistry is to be explained on the basis of physical
processes, or that changes in philosophical outlooks are to be explained from the differences of climate and nutrition, these are no longer methodological principles but
WHAT

theories which must not be allowed to govern observation but must rather emerge
from observation. Of course, I can make merely methodological use of such principles; in this case I use them to bring into sharper focus those phenomena in my area

of investigation which my theories regard as the sole causative powers. There has
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never been a theory that cannot in tum be employed methodologically. Thus also
Jager' s thesis may be employed merely methodologically. Then it says simply that we
have to take account of what it signifies for the religious occurrence that it is incorporated into the cosmic, historical nexus. But we hardly need Jager' s encouragement to
take this step; such methodological impulses have been fully and effectively adopted
into theology for more than a century already, i.e., since the theologian too had to
deal seriously with the concept of history. If that is all that Jager intended to state, then
why his polemical tone and talk of the fresh beginning of a new theological enterprise,
different from all that has gone before>
But Jager also has cheerful counsel for those who have accepted the abandonment
of the concept of God as determinative for theology. They should still feel quite free
to exercise their piety undisturbed as befits their taste and capacity. But this freedom
stands on mysterious footing. The strivings of the older generation (Schleiermacher,
Fries, etc.> to establish and secure such a dualism were incomparably more earnest;
what we hear in Jager gives the impression of being disorganized and lacking in profundity. So, for example, he suddenly talks again of "higher knowledge." In the old
dualism this expression made tolerable sense, since it regarded only the understanding
of phenomena as atheistic; alongside that understanding some "higher knowledge"
might still crop up somewhere, say if alongside pure reason yet another, additional
reason were discovered. But now, after even theology is to be atheistic-where does
"higher knowledge" still come from> Jager likens the results of theological labor to a
photograph that captures the object at a certain angle, noting that "obviously it doesn't
achieve everything." What kind of a mysterious spirit could achieve more> Would it
maybe embellish the photograph or even impart motion to its image? It is true
enough, as Jager writes, that the theologian does not speak the final, most profound
word. But then who does speak it? Certainly not the New Testament, for we have
already "explained" it "without recourse to the concept of God."
In such an approach neither science nor religion retain what is due them. After sci-

ence has first explained everything in purely human terms, it now suddenly becomes
remarkably modest, more modest than is permitted if it really explains. First it has been
demonstrated to us scientifically that our praying is obviously only a monologue. Then
there suddenly comes a "higher voice" and overturns the verdict of science, and sci-

ence--it beats a hasty retreat Will it really be so well-behaved and silently take its
leave at the right moment? First science elucidated for us how Jesus' self-consciousness
necessarily acquired its eccentric form under pressure from the ideas and tendencies
present in contemporary Judaism. Yet we endorse this chain of thought only as "theologians"; we retain the freedom to believe his claim in which he designates himself
the One having come into existence through God. But what about science! Oh-let's
forget about it for the moment. Genuine science is not there so that we can forget about it
How solemnly Jager begins: "We want a scientific theology!" Hats off to this magnificent aspiration' The appearance is given of occupying the heights of resolute love
of truth, of being gripped with a burning desire for certainty and an earnest longing
for reality. But where we end up does not match where we started out: Intrinsic to
this "science" is a profound skepticism. It passes judgment on everything, bold, sover-
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eign, "without recourse to the concept of God." Then it ultimately confesses that it
actually does not compel any particular judgment that would amount to a seriously
binding affirmation, nor does it want to.
In negotiation with Kantianism it has already been said quite clearly for a long time
that dispensing with the idea of God is inevitably tantamount to dispensing with the
idea of truth and is therefore destructive of science. The way in which Jager dismisses

his "science" at the moment it is convenient for him is more support for this argument.
And religion? Here too one need only repeat what has already often been said:
Such a dualism makes unattainable a complete, life-determining devotion of the self to
God. How can double-mindedness be avoided if the theologian and the Christian
stand in irreconcilable opposition to each other in one and the same person? Greatest
caution is required toward that which delivers from science, i.e., delivers from the
canon of truth and earnestness for truth, working mischief in us individually and in the
church in the form of feeling, opinion, "ultimate word," etc.

Of course Kant is also brought in to console us: Science has to do only with
"appearance," not with "essence." But the natural scientist who breaks off his experiment, says to himself "All just phenomena'" and doesn't take seriously his results does
not deserve our admiration. Nor does the historian studying Caesar Augustus or
Napoleon who suddenly claps hand to forehead, cries out "Only phenomena'" and on
that account grants the last word to a "higher voice" instead of to his investigation. The
same goes for the theologian, who first explains religious activity atheistically and thereafter primly says: ''There you are; I have explained only the appearance; think what

you will about the essence." We have no other life than that which we lead as persons
endowed with consciousness. In this life, so constituted, a faith surrendered to God
arose and continues to arise. The flight from this life to a "thing in itself' is a sham.

4.

Do WE GAIN WITH THE ATHEISTIC METHOD?
It is possible to speak of an advantage only if the method is seriously employed
solely as "method." That means it gives direction to the observer's attention, which
WHAT

applies itself to the relation between religious occurrences and the "world." In this

respect Jager' s hopes are not entirely illusory and are in part confirmed by scholarly
methods already long in use. He can rightly say: It would be highly instructive to see
how far an interpretation would get which contemplates religion, thus e.g. Jesus. the
New Testament, the church, our personal faith, only as a product of humans and the
world. The concept of "world" is no phantom; we also cannot measure a pn'ori to

what extent the historical sequence of events is a closed unity. Far less can we measure a prion· how the presence and activity of divine grace and truth are mediated

within that unity. To be sure, presently the physiological aspect of the concept of
"world" is still meaningless for the theologian. Questions like: Are the religious
processes contingent upon individual formations of the brain? If so in what way? To
what extent does race exercise an influence? etc., result only in empty prattle. Such
observations obtain theological significance only when they have become an assured

part of anthropology and are not just empty words for an impenetrable mystery. It is
different with those observations which are directed toward the relationship of the
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individual to the people, of private thought to speech, of the individual will to the collective will of the community, of the spiritual heritage of some present moment to the
past and the logical and ethical bonds transcending the individual which are at work
here. Along this line we have already observed much. And there remains much more
painstakingly to assimilate in the areas of biblical history, church history, and the
course of individual lives, our own as well as others. But offsetting this gain from the
approach hailed by Jager as the exclusively justified one is a vast quantity of mistakes.
And the more his approach ceases actually to be method and assumes lordship as
"leitmotif," the more it becomes a disastrous source of error.
Observation is not an empty word; the wonderful ability to see is granted to us,
also in the historical sphere. By observation we can discern the occurrences that form

the inner life of the human individual and of humanity. And yet-how fragmented
and divergent our contemporary theological literature, even in those matters that are
determinative for our judgment on the basis of ostensibly empirical considerations'
Why? Because it is just as certain that observation requires the use of our own eyes,
and they are informed by that which, as our intellectual holdings, exercises control
over us. The relinquishing of ourselves which is part of every authentic observation,
which takes the form of devotion to that which has happened, can never and should
never obliterate us. We are the ones who must see, and our eyes are our primary

equipment for carrying out the work of thinking That is why it is no light matter
which "leitmotif' we submit ourselves to. Now if we determine to explain religion
based on solely this-worldly factors, then from the outset our observation consistently
stands in radical contradiction to our object, which emphatically does not lend itself to
such explanation, but loudly and steadfastly insists upon the concept of God. Our
object intends that we think about God; the observer wills to think "without recourse
to the concept of God.'' Here lies a sharp conflict of wills; if enmeshed in it, are we
still able to see what lies before us? And the more we determine not merely to
observe but also to explain, the more the object is shaped to fit into the scheme that
we have already constructed, and the more our work becomes a caricature of science.
What purports to be science transmutes into polemic against its object, and the result
is not an account of the past but a novel whose main character is the historian.
Perhaps the opponent will rebuke me by calling attention to the antiquated theology which "explains" the world and Scripture "solely on the basis of God,'' along with
that theology's historical attainments in exegesis, in christology, in the preservation and

shaping of the recollections of the experiences of the church, in the biographies of the
saints, etc. There, the opponent will point out, it was not the "atheistic method" that
was guilty of clouding the picture of history, but its opposite. l take it to be just as little
the calling of the theologian to "explain religion solely on the basis of God" as to
"explain it solely on the basis of this-worldly factors.'' The theological rationalism of
the Greeks was as mistaken with its postulates as the profane, modern manufacture of
conjectures is. If we succeed at truly grasping what generates the certainty of God for
us humans, how that certainty so secures itself in us that it becomes certainty and we
are able to believe, how it manages to furnish us the inner motivation for will and
action, so that the love of God arises and obedience springs up, and all this in such a
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way that not only hermits here and there in shattered isolation experience the illumination of God's light, but in such a way that the church of God comes into being-that
would be theology enough for now. Admittedly such theology does not come about
"without recourse to the idea of God"; it rather has its sole object and goal in him.
Briefly just a couple more matters: The invitation for us to subscribe to the atheistic

method of theology has been published in Die Christliche Welt, which takes great pains
to stay abreast of the growth of Catholic theology. If one looks back at the relationship between Catholic and Protestant theology in the first half of the nineteenth century, the reversal in Catholic outlook is highly instructive. Does Die Christliche Welt
think that the atheistic method in Protestant theology will improve that relationship?
Will that relationship be enhanced by the Protestant faculties' avoidance of the truthquestion, their burying the question of God and their "explaining religion solely on the
basis of this-worldly factors"? If the Protestant faculties still talk of "religion," but no
longer retain any knowledge of God, and their Catholic colleagues are the only ones
left to pose the question of God, and they answer it by the means at their disposal
(even if these are only the means furnished by Thomism), then it is likely to become
obvious pretty quickly who needs help from whose theology.
And one last point: Jager's summons has reminded us of the dignity that we possess as members of the university. As already stated, I absolutely respect this appeal to
the high intellectual ideals of our universities. But it is not only to colleagues in the
philosophy department that we are under obligation. As members of the university
we have our dignity above all in that we stand as teachers before those studying
under us. Should we turn our young people into ministers according to atheistic
method? Should we face them having retreated to Jagers position: 'True, theology
that has surrendered the concept of God does not achieve everything; but there are
still final, deepest words beyond theology·? Certainly: There are still final words to be
added to theology proceeding on atheistic premises. And sometimes they will be
unwelcome words-yet sometimes words by which actually someone besides the theologian begins to speak. tearing atheistic theology, its concept of the world, and its
concept of religion locked up in human subjectivity to shreds.

I would like ta express my graritude ta Professor Peter Stiihlmacher of Tiibingen, Mrs. Anna
Kuhn and ta Professor Robert Yarbrough far reading aver this translation and affenng many
help/itf suggestions. - Trans.
NOTES

I.
[Wilhelm Llitgert ( 1863-1938), New Testament scholar and theologian who studied under
Schlatter at Greifswald in the 1890s, had delivered a paper at the Eisenach Conference in 1903 in

which he challenged Ernst Troeltsch's separation of the theological and historical tasks. J3ger's essay
responds to Ll.itgert' s address. See Heinzpeter Hempelmann, "Nachwort," in Adolf Schlatter,
Atheistischen Methaden in der Theo/agie, ed. by Hempelmann (Wuppertat R. Brockhaus, 1985), 3235.I

2.
Whoever shares Jager' s view cannot possibly be surprised if those who are deeply concerned for the gospel manifest a deep suspicion and spirited protest against "theology, and if
for many in Germany it is gradually becoming a weighty question how the church can be supN
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plied with suitable clergy, since the scientific activity of the theological faculties is becoming
increasingly unsuited for this.
3.
It is also interesting that ethics is forgotten, because it documents the scant connection
that exists between the theological activity called for by Jager and the New Testament. Simply
reading the Epistle to the Romans does not make anyone a Paulinist, but it is hardly thinkable
that someone reading Romans could avoid colliding with the problem of the will. He would
from then on be aware of questions like: What does the exercise of fleshly will involve, and
what about spiritual, divine willing? How do we become free of the former and participate in
the latter? etc. And whoever is gripped by such questions certainly does not forget ethics when
he speaks of the goal of theology.

